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Recent academic and policy preoccupations with ‘Black Swans’ underscore the 
predicament of capturing and communicating risk events when information is 
absent, partial, incomplete or contingent. In this article we wish to articulate 
some key thematic and theoretical points of concurrence around which academic 
and practitioner interests in risk communication under conditions of ‘high 
uncertainty’ intersect. We outline the historical context and recent debate 
concerning the limits to ‘risk thinking’ spurred by Black Swans, and in particular 
how this calls for a more holistic approach to risk communication. In order to 
support a more critical foresight agenda, we suggest incorporating ‘adaptive 
governance’ principles to decenter focal risk communication concerns on the 
mitigation of short-term security threats, which critics argue can also lead to 
other unforeseen dangers. Finally, we welcome further interdisciplinary inquiry 




















When resources are plentiful one can always hope, rightly or 
wrongly, to stay 'on top of' or 'ahead of' things, to be able to catch 
up with the fast-moving targets; one might then be inclined to play 
down the risks and insecurity and assume that the profusion of 
choices compensates many times over for the discomforts of living 
in the dark, of never being sure when and where the struggle ends 
or whether it has an end at all. 







Indeterminacy about future harm is an age-old concern, but recently the 
manifestation of highly uncertain threats in the form of ‘Black Swans’ (Taleb 
2007) has led to calls for a critical re-appraisal of the application and capacities 
of risk-based approaches to assess and manage future harms. This article aims to 
contribute to on-going academic and policy debate on the problems and 
prospects of dealing with Black Swans by paying especial attention to the related 
issues and difficulties surrounding risk communication under conditions of high 
uncertainty and how they might be overcome. In particular, we reflect on how a 
holistic approach to risk communication, underpinned by principles of ‘adaptive 
governance’ may help to move considerations forward to support the adoption 
of a more critical foresight agenda.  
 
The article is organized into four main thematic sections and a conclusion. 
First, we outline some key historical developments in risk thinking and practice 
in relation to uncertainty that serve to prefigure current institutional responses 
to future threats. Next, we consider the relatively recent emergence of Taleb’s 
(2007) Black Swan thesis along with other forms of ‘high uncertainty’ 
popularized through vernacular such as ‘unknown unknowns’. We then identify 
how Black Swans prompt important consideration of the use and value of risk-
based conventions, and how this focal preoccupation has subsequently led to a 
renewed emphasis on mechanisms orientated towards anticipation and 
foresight. In view of difficulties resulting from ‘anticipatory solutions’ to 
‘foresighted problems’, we point to the need for a more holistic approach to help 
decenter the current focus on short-term security outcomes common to 
uncritical responses to Black Swans. Subsequently, we suggest that a more 
holistic formulation of risk communication according with ‘adaptive governance’ 
principles would help to critically expand the scope, logics and capacities of 
organized risk responses when confronting high uncertainty. In conclusion, we 
welcome further critical and interdisciplinary inquiry into Black Swans to help 
support these objectives. 
 
2. Against the Gods:  The emergence of risk thinking 
 
Human civilization has long had to contend with individual and collective 
threats to survival arising from an uncertain, complex and ever-changing 
environment (Plough and Krimsky 1987). Historically speaking, people’s 
expectations and experiential understandings of uncertainty surrounding the 
occurrence of adverse eventualities has owed much to concepts such as ‘fate’, 
‘chance’ and ‘the hands of the Gods’ (see Bernstein 1996; Giddens 1999). In such 
terms, all manner and varieties of harm and loss could be taken at face value as 
people seemingly had little choice but to live in the hope it was fortune smiling 
on them and not the sword of Damocles hanging over them (Klinke and Renn 
2002). Being resilient in the face of uncertainty thus meant not only dealing with 
adverse eventualities as they arose, but also accepting that one had little choice 
in such matters. 
 
Historians and sociologists note that the emergence of ‘risk’ thinking into 
this context consequently provided a powerful new lens through which to re-
orientate thinking about the future (Bernstein 1998; Hacking 1990). According 
to Rose (1999) the key innovation of risk lay in its affordance for making 
intelligible a series of problems of contemporary existence by bringing the future 
into the present and ostensibly making uncertain eventualities calculable. For 
Knight (1924), the measurability of risk in particular marked it out as 
conceptually distinct from uncertainty, for which quantities were assumed not to 
be susceptible to measurement. According to this view, risk refers to a situation 
of perfect knowledge whereby all the possible probabilities and outcomes are 
known and in which there is a ‘correct’ or ‘optimal’ answer, whereas in cases of 
uncertainty all the probabilities are unknown or unknowable (Volz and 
Gigerenzer 2013). In economic terms, the incorporation of constructs such as 
‘probability’ and ‘expected value’ into risk measurement provided decision 
makers with a scientific calculus for being ‘rationally’ concerned about some 
potential eventualities and choosing to ignore others (Aven and Renn 2009). 
This meant that probable outcomes arising from potential eventualities could be 
determined, and fortune or loss could be assigned to deliberate choices from a 
range of possible options (Bernstein 1998; Rosa 1998). Reasonable attempts 
could accordingly be made to engage in actions that might enhance profit, but 
also to help to mitigate or offset the downsides of any potential choices where 
the costs were manageable and the upsides provided insufficient potential 
rewards in and of themselves (Ewald 1991).  
 
The conceptual innovations brought about by risk thinking proved to be 
immensely successful for protecting beneficial activities in the face of routine 
risks and improbable disasters (Bernstein 1998). Subsequently, the logics and 
practices of risk assessment and management rapidly spread. Moreover, the 
language and scope of risk markedly expanded into many domains as new means 
and forms of risk related information collection, measurement and application 
were necessitated or arose (Mythen 2014b; Rose 1996). Notwithstanding the 
importance of the fundamental distinctions between risk and uncertainty 
specified above, in everyday life and working practices, risk related decisions are 
rarely made with perfect knowledge. Rather, it is customary to not know all of 
the possibilities, alternatives, probabilities and consequences (Volz and 
Gigerenzer 2013). So, while in principle uncertainty may be reduced through 
seeking more information (van Asselt and Vos 2006), in practice decision-
makers assess risk under conditions that are inherently uncertain, except in 
highly prescribed contexts. 
 
Nowadays, preoccupation with risk is commonplace. The use of risk 
related tools and practices has accelerated at pace over the past forty years or so 
colonizing activities across individual, social and institutional domains in areas 
as varied as food safety, technology, business, the environment, criminal justice, 
education and welfare (Beck 1992; Renn 1998; Rothstein, Huber and Gaskell 
2006; Mythen, 2014b). Most risk-based policies and practices also typically 
accord with a view that scientific progress is often driven by a need to 
understand uncertainty, and that scientific inquiry can reveal new uncertainties 
needing to be addressed (Pidgeon and Fischhoff 2011). Therefore, instead of 
employing absolute distinctions, risk is perhaps best conceived as a relational 
construct that is intermingled with uncertainty (van Asselt and Vos 2006). In 
these terms, risk may be broadly defined as an uncertain threat posed by an 
activity or event with respect to something that humans value (Boholm and 
Corvellec 2011). Following this cognitive framing of risk, the introduction or use 
of risk logics and practices can be considered as an interpretative process that 
brings fluidity into ostensibly ‘solid’ categories of existence that have otherwise 
previously established meaningful distinctions and experiential encounters of 
uncertainty and harm (Bauman 2000; 2007).  
 
Identifying and dealing with risk in its varied modes has become central 
to contemporary forms of organizing and social ordering (Beck 1992; Power 
2007; Hardy and Maguire 2016). How people differentially perceive, evaluate 
and respond to risk has therefore also been accounted for by developments in 
measuring individual and cultural attitudes and observed behaviours (Slovic et 
al. 2004). This additional form of risk measurement has made it possible to 
ascertain who is considered to be risk seeking, who is considered to be risk 
averse, and how this varies with respect to different types of appraisal and levels 
of benefit, harm and uncertainty across different contexts and cultures 
(Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982; Slovic et al. 2004; Wright and Philips 
1980). Armed with such information it is theoretically possible to determine not 
only behavioral tendencies of populations and sub-populations, but also to 
specify socially acceptable levels of risk beyond purely scientific and economic 
considerations of ‘how safe is safe enough’ (Fischhoff et al. 1978; Renn 1998). 
Risk communication, by extension, is now widely acknowledged to play a vital 
role in these processes, not only as an informational tool by which to gather, 
learn and share information, but also as the primary means by which organized 
responses to risk are constituted across locations in different relational forms 
(Wardman 2008). Knowing information that is predictive of risks and how 
people appraise and respond to risk in light of such preferences together 
provides a vital apparatus for planning future action, managing and responding 
to risk events as they unfold, and introducing or reinforcing regulations and 
procedures to improve safety and risk related conduct (Burns and Slovic 2012; 
Lemke 2001; Mythen 2014a; Rose 1999).  
 
 
3. Against the odds: the emergence of Black Swans 
 
 
All of the above defines the contours and parameters under which 
contemporary decisions making around risk communication and management 
take place, both at an individual and an institutional level. Yet, in the course of 
the twenty-first century, a range of high profile global incidents - among them 
9/11, the devastating earthquake in Kashmir, the Aceh tsunami and the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster - have become emblematic of the limits of predictive 
tools of risk management, prompting risk managers to reconsider how to 
identify, characterize and act on uncertainty. Taleb (2007) famously refers to the 
manifestation of these rare and unpredictable occurrences as ‘Black Swans’. 
Others have dubbed such happenings ‘tail end risks’, ‘deep uncertainties’, 
‘uncertain risks’, and ‘post-normal risks’ (Aven 2013; Cox 2012; McCulloch and 
Pickering, 2010; Mythen and Walklate, 2010; Rosa 1998; van Asselt and Vos 
2008).  
 
Following Taleb (2007), Black Swans are typically characterized as novel 
or surprising risk events with major impacts that no one thought would happen 
beforehand and afterwards challenge pre-conceived assumptions. That is, with 
the benefit of hindsight it is thought that these ‘outlying’ risk events could have 
been better predicted and accounted for despite their occurrence or impacts 
seemingly being indeterminate at the time (see also Aven 2015, for a delineation 
of types of Black Swan). In popular terms, concern about the problem of high 
uncertainty for risk management has also been encapsulated by the United 
States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s (2002) infamous response to the 
lack of evidence linking the Iraq government to the supply of weapons of mass 
destruction to terrorist groups: 
 
Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, 
because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we 
know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are 
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones 
we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our 
country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the 
difficult ones.  
 
Although much maligned, this remark on the difficulties presented by ‘unknown 
unknowns’ clearly chimes with Taleb’s (2007) critique both that high 
uncertainty can confound conventional risk assessment procedures, and that 
presumptions of certainty ostensibly arising from decisions based on 
probabilistic assessments may prove to be a recipe for disaster. Together with 
the social explosion of risk images and concerns perpetuated by the media (Beck 
1995), situations of high uncertainty have understandably been held up to shine 
a spotlight on the limits of institutional capabilities to foresee hazards and pre-
emptively intervene in disasters (Mythen 2014a). There is now a growing 
acceptance that, because risk is embedded in larger contexts of social and 
organizational relations and processes, many problems cannot always be 
controlled or fully accounted for following the ‘routine’ conventions and 
practices of risk-based approaches and more can and ought to be done (Aven 
2013; Aven 2015; Cox 2013; Kline and Renn 2002; Mythen 2014a).  
 
Consequently, over the last decade - and partly as a response to failures in 
risk assessment and intelligence gathering - regulatory institutions have become 
engrossed in numerous attempts to better account for highly uncertain 
eventualities (Brown and Olofsson 2014). Such foresight initiatives typically 
involve the development of scenarios to anticipate and examine in advance the 
prospects and likely implications of a hypothetical event and its outcomes. More 
broadly speaking, future orientated methodologies might also incorporate tools 
and techniques of visioning, forecasting, visualization, and plan-making in order 
to address the question ‘what if?’ and lay the grounds for anticipating and 
reacting to different events should they occur (Freestone 2012). The use of such 
methods is notably observed in the field of counter-terrorism and national 
security (Walklate and Mythen 2015; Mythen and Walklate 2008; Stern and 
Weiner 2006), but is also increasingly apparent in relation to natural, health and 
technological hazards as observed through responses to indeterminacy about 
the causes and effects surrounding the cases of global warming, flooding, 
pandemic infectious disease outbreaks, and nuclear accidents (Barbi and 
Ferreira 2014; Figuie 2014; Pate-Cornell 2012). Additionally, political drives 
towards greater institutional transparency have led to calls for all uncertainties 
associated with risk assessment to be publicly disclosed (Lofstedt and Wardman 
2016). As such, the staging and communication of uncertainty is increasingly 
becoming part and parcel of the contemporary risk landscape (Beck 2009), with 
activities ranging from training drills to evaluate preparedness for CBRNE 
attacks, to politicians hypothesizing about the nature of upcoming threats to the 
nation from terrorist cells, and the disclosure of incertitude surrounding the 
assessment of these and many other risks.  
 
4. Hindsight does not equal foresight 
 
Insofar as risk practitioners and academics are understood to be 
routinely pre-occupied with uncertainty related problems in various guises, the 
concept of Black Swans might seemingly appear to add merely another flavor to 
the wide variety and types of uncertainty that already befuddle regulatory 
institutions (Arvai 2014; Kasperson 2014; Pidgeon 2014; McCommas 2014). 
However, as critics have recently pointed out, a deep-seated problem 
confronting institutions is that they typically lack fundamental strategic capacity 
not only in uncertainty assessment, but also appropriate risk communication 
methods for situating values in public engagement or fostering citizen 
deliberation for the wider public good (Kasperson 2014; Pidgeon and Fischhoff 
2011; Pidgeon 2014). Therefore, attending to high uncertainty has proven 
notably problematic to risk-based approaches for a host of reasons, which not 
only exacerbate current problems and stretch current capabilities, but can also 
introduce new concerns and dilemmas.  
 
To illustrate the point from a ‘risk assessment’ perspective, the 
occurrence of uncertain risk events, which is to say Black Swans, may be 
considered so rare, or the consequences so unthinkable, that there is insufficient 
basis for identification or measurement that would otherwise allow the 
prediction of losses and avert accidents or catastrophes (Pate-Cornell 2012). 
Attempts to assess the risk of Black Swans might not therefore so easily employ 
the traditional tools and techniques that are conventionally associated with 
rational evidence-based approaches to identifying and managing risk. The 
associated worry is that without the ‘decision-analytic’ rigor conferred by risk-
based thinking, regulatory focus on Black Swans may become undisciplined and 
susceptible to the biases or paradoxical thinking leveled at the use of pre-
emptive approaches to risk. Particularly, a preponderance on ‘worst case’ 
scenarios seemingly common to the focus of Black Swan narratives can introduce 
unforeseen dangers and costs (Walklate and Mythen, 2015; Stern and Weiner 
2006). At the same time, institutions need to remain alert, quickly detect risks as 
they arise, and provide the earliest possible response (Pate-Cornell 2012). 
 
From a ‘risk communication’ perspective, while best practice guidance is 
replete with advice that uncertainty should in principle always be acknowledged, 
many longstanding questions abound concerning how best to incorporate 
uncertainty into risk communication in practice. These questions include: ‘what’ 
uncertainties to communicate; ‘which’ format to use; ‘when’ to communicate 
uncertainty; ‘whom’ to involve; and to ‘what ends’? Despite the importance of 
these questions, empirical research has not yet provided declarative support for 
the efficacy of uncertainty communication guidance or how best to proceed. To 
wit, while making the full catalogue of uncertainty information available can be 
informative and useful to some stakeholders, there are general reservations that 
for others it might not be required, can be confusing, contribute to ‘information 
fatigue’, or bring about behavioural changes that cause more harm than good 
(Fischhoff 2013; Kasperson 2014; Wardman and Lofstedt 2009). A further worry 
is that if people are overwhelmed, or feel the communication of high uncertainty 
is unwarranted, that this can also lead to accusations that risk managers are 
intentionally obfuscating ‘real’ risk concerns (Fischhoff 1995). At the same time, 
foreclosing opportunities for communication might send a message that those 
same risk managers think others cannot be trusted with such information, or 
thought not worth talking to (Fischhoff 1995). This can in turn prove alienating 
and confirm suspicions of political and managerial irresponsibility, leading to a 
further erosion of trust in regulatory institutions and other organizations (Leiss 
1996; Lofstedt 2005).  
 
While few would argue that encouraging reflection on safety and 
promoting preparedness is a bad thing, in certain areas of risk regulation, such 
as counter-terrorism, the disentangling of tangible facts and probabilities from 
hypothetical worst-case imaginations has served to muddy the waters between 
what is possible and what is probable. Within this, the envisaging and pre-
mediation of particular types of attack, both politically and in the mass media, 
produces impacts on people’s consciousness and informs public perceptions of 
danger. Pre-mediations act as harbingers of harm that do not so much present 
what has happened, but foster speculation about what may happen next. 
Building on Baudrillard’s 1984 work, we can caution against situations of hyper-
riskality, in which the imagined risks begin to take on greater resonance than 
those which appear to be tangible and estimable (see Mythen and Walklate, 
2010). In such a febrile climate, pre-emptive interventions are not so much 
encouraged, as demanded. Responsibility for guarding against future harms very 
much depends on assertive action in the present (Amoore, 2007). Yet problems 
arises when dystopic future occurrences - however statistically remote - are 
acted on as if they were likely possibilities (see Amoore, 2013: 1). Dick Cheney’s 
infamous ‘one percent doctrine’, where only a hundredth of a fraction of a risk to 
national security should propel concerted action is an apt illustration of this kind 
of pre-emptive delirium (see Suskind 2007). As Hudson (2013, 9) observes, 
‘unlike the normal logic of risk management, precautionary logic does not entail 
actuarial calculations of the disastrous event occurring, its mere possibility is 
sufficient to bring forth preventive actions’. 
 
Opinion is plainly divided on how to conceive and implement anticipatory 
approaches to high uncertainty in practice (see for example controversy over the 
use of the ‘precautionary principle’: Aven 2011; Lofstedt 2014). Yet, if an 
underlying point can be taken from the disruption posed by the focal 
preoccupation with Black Swans to institutional risk thinking and practices, it is 
perhaps that, without due care, decisions under high uncertainty will continue to 
be punctured by political bias and filtered through sociocultural values and 
expectations (Dietz 2013; Slovic 1993; Slovic 1999; Wardman 2014). The 
uncritical use of foresighted risk interventions will accordingly boil down to 
questions of democratic accountability and where the power lies, as much as 
how ‘best’ to effectively assess, represent, communicate and learn from events 
characterized by partial, incomplete, and contingent information. In the event, 
information about some uncertain eventualities may not or may not be shared, 
such as for security reasons, and the reasons for doing so may not be wholly 




5. Accounting for that which can’t be counted: Sustaining a critical foresight 
agenda 
 
There are no easy answers to the problems and dilemmas highlighted 
above, but clearly an uncritical emphasis on high uncertainty can be potentially 
detrimental to goals of allocating risk management attention and resources in 
the most effective and efficient ways. Reconciling concerns about such issues as 
the costs, benefits and countervailing risks of addressing Black Swans therefore 
requires adopting a more expansive and critical ‘foresight’ agenda. One 
pragmatic response is that high uncertainty accordingly calls for risk-based 
approaches to become more integrative, adaptive and process driven (Aven 
2013; Cox 2012; Klinke and Renn 2012). In this view, rather than focusing on 
short term security concerns, the identification and risk management of Black 
Swan events is considered to evolve over time and incorporate new information 
from a range of different perspectives as it comes to light in a manner that is also 
reflective of sociocultural and political values.  
 
The formalization of pluralistic rationales and methodologies to help 
address the limits of conventional ‘evidence based’ approaches and incorporate 
alternative views has been developed previously in epistemologically orientated 
frameworks (e.g. Rosa 1998; Klinke and Renn 2002). For example, Klinke and 
Renn (2012) specify that adaptive and integrative approaches should ideally 
incorporate the following attributes: 
 
- Embody a dynamic process of continuous and gradual learning 
- Be guided by the inclusion of different values and frames of reference 
- Screen for risk related features through ‘pre-estimation’  
- Conduct interdisciplinary risk and concern assessments incorporating 
natural/technical science and social science perspectives 
- Evaluate limits of knowledge and find ‘common ground’ to resolve 
ambiguities and complexities 
- Make the selection and implementation of policies subject to on-going 
monitoring and adjustment to calibrate responses  
 
One key implication for practitioners arising from incorporating an adaptive 
perspective is that generating prescriptive step-by-step risk communication 
plans, or adopting static standardized best practice guidance specifying ‘exactly 
what to do’ in response to Black Swan events may in fact be counterproductive. 
As Coombs (2013) observes, unknown-unknowns are, by definition, 
unknowable, and, given that even ‘known knowns’ don't always pan out 
according to plan, it is better to focus attention on the process of dealing with 
novel events. This requires emphasis on having knowledge and skills that can be 
applied flexibly when reacting to the moment rather than setting prescribed 
actions. Coombs (2013) suggests, for example, that preparations for 
communicative responses within organizations should accordingly focus on 
developing collective working practices and honing communication skills that 
can be adapted to whatever crisis takes place. Organizations that involve regular 
dialogue with stakeholders when developing and maintaining their foresight 
policies are also thought to be better positioned to anticipate and build 
capacities to react to Black Swan events as they arise (Aven 2013; 2015). 
Establishing good relations with stakeholders can also foster greater co-
operation making operational responses to Black Swans less vulnerable to 
conflict, as well as help to meet and manage expectations for greater 
transparency and honesty (Coombs 2013).  
 
For researchers, it is also commonly understood that, while efforts are often 
made to limit mistakes and oversights, post hoc critical analysis must take place 
and lessons need to be learned when risk management goes awry (Fischhoff 
1995). Studies may aim to provide a means to calibrate whether institutions turn 
out to be over confident or under confident in their predictions. Research inquiry 
may also be targeted to understand how ostensibly ‘unknown unknowns’ 
become normalised as knowable risks to be avoided or managed (Hardy and 
Maguire 2016).  
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
If an underlying point can be ascertained, it is that Black Swans are not 
simply out there waiting to be discovered. Rather, much like other risks, Black 
Swans are constructs that are produced through different knowledge processes 
and discursive practices (Klinke and Renn 2012). Such knowledge, and how it 
forms a legitimate basis for action or inaction, is privileged selectively through 
established mechanisms that grant authority to certain agents and institutions 
that determine which truths are meaningful (Brown and Olofsson 2014; Hardy 
and Maguire 2016; Wardman 2008). We argue that the associated task is to 
adopt a more expansive and critical view of communicative responses to Black 
Swans. This has great implications for risk academics and practitioners alike. If 
attempts aimed to address the problem of high uncertainty are to prove more than 
simply haphazard and opportunistic, it is imperative that critical evaluations of 
high uncertainty are undertaken that take account of the social, political, ethical 
and material forces that delineate and shape its interpretation, uses, processes, and 
ultimately its consequences. Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that scholars 
in the natural and social science disciplines have been actively grappling with the 
problem of high uncertainty and have sought to assist regulatory institutions, 
law enforcement agencies and the emergency response services in resilience and 
capability in dealing with such risks. Future opportunities for cross-disciplinary 
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